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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TERRY RAY MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981179-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant, Terry Ray Miller, appeals from an order revoking his probation and 
executing his sentences for one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance, third degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996), and one count 
of carrying a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was defendant1 s right to have counsel present at his probation violation hearing 
violated where the trial court informed defendant of his right to counsel and defendant 
nevertheless decided to waive that right? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court reviews the question of whether 
the right to counsel has been properly waived for correctness, granting the district court 
a reasonable measure of discretion when applying the law to the facts. State v. Byington. 
936 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 780-81 
(Utah App. 1996)). 
2. Did the district court's failure to serve an order to show cause on defendant prior 
to his probation violation hearing deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because this issue was not raised or addressed below, 
no standard of review is applicable. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a joint appeal of two district court cases, Second Judicial District Court 
Nos. 951900423 and 951900659.1 
On May 15, 1995, defendant Terry Ray Miller was charged by information with 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, one a second 
degree felony and the other a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (1996), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996) (R. 1:1-3). On July 19, 
1995, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance, third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) (R. 1:25-37). 
Subsequently, on August 1, 1995, defendant was charged by information with one 
count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996), 
and two counts of carrying a concealed weapon, class B misdemeanors, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995)(R. 11:1-9). After one of the counts of carrying 
a concealed weapon was not bound over for trial (R. 16), defendant pleaded guilty to one 
1
 The records below are each individually paginated beginning with page one. 
Because the record in case no. 951900423 is labeled volume I and the record in case no. 
951900659 is labeled volume II, this brief will refer to specific pages in each record by the 
volume number followed the page number. For example, page four of the record in case 
no. 951900423 will be cited as R. 1:4. 
3 
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count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58»37a-5 (1996), 
and one count of carrying a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995) (R. 11:21-27). 
On August 31, 1995, the district court sentenced defendant in both cases. 
In case no. 951900423, the court ordered defendant to serve two indeterminate terms of 
zero-to-five-years in the Utah State Prison (R. 1:44-46). In case no. 951900659, the court 
ordered defendant to serve an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison for the second degree felony count and one year in the Weber County Jail for the 
class B misdemeanor counts (R. 11:28-30). However, the court suspended defendant's 
sentences and placed him on probation subject to certain terms and conditions (id.). 
The terms of defendant's probation included provisions that defendant submit to probation 
supervision by the Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole, pay for probation 
supervision fees, and not possess any controlled substances (id.). 
On December 12, 1996, Probation Officer Larry Chatterton filed an affidavit in 
both cases indicating that defendant had violated his probation by possessing a controlled 
substance (R. 1:48-49, 11:33-34). A hearing was held in January 1997 and defendant's 
probation was restarted in both cases with additional conditions (R. 1:52-53,11:46-47). 
4 
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On March 4, 1997, Probation Officer Blake G. Woodring filed an affidavit in case 
no. 951900423 indicating that defendant had violated his probation by absconding 
probation supervision (R. 1:59-60). On January 12, 1998, Probation Officer Andrew 
McCain filed an affidavit in case no. 951900659 indicating that defendant had violated his 
probation by having twice possessed controlled substances and by failing to make probation 
supervision payments (R. 11:48-49). However, no order to show cause appears in either 
case file. At a hearing on February 2, 1998, defendant waived his right to have counsel 
present and admitted that he had violated his probation (R. 87:1-3). Following two other 
hearings on February 23 and March 9, 1998 (R. 1:64-65, 11:55-56, 88:1-14, 89:1-8), 
at which defendant was represented by counsel, defendant's probation was revoked and his 
sentences in both cases were reinstated with the prison terms to run concurrently 
(R. 1:68-69,11:57-58). 
Defendant's timely notices of appeal ensued (R. 1:74-75,11:67-68). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
No statement of facts beyond those set forth above is necessary to resolve the issues 
presented on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant raises two issues on appeal: first, he contends that the trial court erred 
by permitting him to admit that he violated his probation without having counsel present. 
Specifically, defendant claims that he was entitled to the extensive admonitions regarding 
5 
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self-representation as discussed in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
However, as this Court has previously held in State v. Bvington. 936 P.2d 1112 
(Utah App. 1997), the exacting Faretta standard for effecting a proper waiver of counsel 
applies only to the waiver of a constitutional right to counsel which is not applicable here. 
Thus, under Byington. the colloquy in this case was sufficient to render defendant's waiver 
of his statutory right to counsel proper. Second, defendant claims that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the court failed to serve an order to show cause 
on him prior to his probation violation hearing. However, failure to serve an order to 
show cause does not deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
defendant's conviction is entitled to affirmance on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT 
AT HIS PROBATION HEARING WAS NOT VIOLATED 
BECAUSE HE VALIDLY WAIVED THAT RIGHT. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the district court erred by allowing him to admit 
that he violated the terms of his probation without having counsel present at his probation 
violation hearing. Aplt. Brief at 10-13. Specifically, defendant claims that under Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), the district court should have engaged defendant 
in an extensive colloquy concerning self-representation prior to accepting his waiver. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Court has previously addressed the very argument raised by defendant here in 
State v. Bvington. 936 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1997). In Bvington. the Court held that the 
assistance of counsel at a probation revocation hearing is constitutionally guaranteed only 
in certain, limited circumstances. Id. at 1115. Specifically, counsel should be provided 
only in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer 
"makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim 
(i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the 
conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the 
violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there 
are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the 
violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the 
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
present." 
LI (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)). Additionally, in passing on 
a request for appointment of counsel, the district court should also consider whether the 
probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. Id. at 1115-1116 
(citing Gagnon. 411 U.S. at 790-91). Thus, "to protect the constitutional right to counsel, 
a trial court must 'determine if this waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly and 
intelligently made.*" Id at 1116 (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 
(Utah 1987)) (citing Godinez v. Moran. 509 U.S. 389, 400-04 (1993)). 
In this case, defendant did not contest the alleged probation violations, nor did he 
present any argument regarding why his probation should not have been revoked 
(R. 87:2-3). As noted by the Scarpelli Court, a probationer's "admission to having 
7 
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committed another serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which counsel need 
not ordinarily be provided." Scarpelli. 411 U.S. at 791; accord Bvington. 936 P.2d at 
.1116. Therefore, as in Bvington. defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at 
his probation revocation hearing. 
Nor was defendant denied his statutory right to counsel under the circumstances of 
this case. Although defendant was entitled to counsel at the probation revocation hearing 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(c)(iii) (Supp. 1996), this Court held in Bvington that 
"the strict Frampton standards for safeguarding the constitutional right to counsel do not 
apply where the right to counsel is provided for by statute because procedural rights do not 
generally warrant the same protections as do constitutional rights." IcL (citing People v. 
Clark. 510 N.E.2d 1256, 1257-58 (111. App. Ct. 1987); Jester v. Board of Probation & 
Parole. 595 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); State v. Conlin. 744 P.2d 1094, 1096 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987)):cf.Neelv.Holden. 886 P.2d 1097,1104 (Utah 1994) (explaining 
analytical distinction between statutory and constitutional right to counsel). Instead, 
"waiver of a statutory right to counsel is proper as long as the record as a whole reflects 
the probationer's reasonable understanding of the proceedings and awareness of the right 
to counsel." Bvington. 936 P.2d at 1117 (citing Coon v. State. 675 So. 2d 94, 96-97 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Clark. 510 N.E.2d at 1258; Jester. 595 A.2d at 751; Conlin. 
744 P.2d at 1096). As with the standard for waiving the constitutional right to counsel, 
there is no bright-line test for determining whether the probationer has properly waived 
8 
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his statutory right to counsel; instead, it will depend upon "' the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding each case.'" IcL (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188). 
In this case, the following colloquy took place at a hearing on February 2, 1998: 
THE COURT: Yeah. You understand that you've been vio-or 
charged with violating your probation, Mr. Miller. 
MR. MILLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Two different cases. 
MR. MILLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand that you're entitled to be represented 
by an attorney. If you can't afford one, we'll provide one. 
MR. MILLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did you want to talk to an attorney about this? 
MR. MILLER: No. 
THE COURT: You understand that you're entitled to deny the 
affidavit and have a hearing on the issue of whether you did or didn' t violate 
your probation. 
MR. MILLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that«what--what would you like to do? 
MR. MILLER: I'll just-I just want to plead to it. 
THE COURT: All right. To the charge of having violated your 
probation as outlined in the affidavit on the two cases, do you admit that or 
deny it, Mr. Miller? 
MR. MILLER: To one and two? 
9 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR.MILLER: I admit it. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll refer the thing back to probation for 
an updated report. What we'd like you to do is talk to Mr. Woodring there. 
What, the 23rd maybe? 
MR. WOODRING: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll want you back here on the 23rd of 
February at two o'clock in the afternoon for sentencing. 
MR.MILLER: Okay. 
(R. 87:2-3). 
It is readily apparent from this colloquy that the defendant was specifically informed 
of the allegations against him and told that counsel would be appointed if he requested. 
Furthermore, the district court made defendant aware of the consequences of his probation 
being revoked by informing him that he had to return on February 23 for sentencing. 
Thus, the district court did not err in accepting defendant's waiver of his statutory right 
to counsel in this case.2 
2
 Moreover, even if the district court had erred by allowing defendant to admit to 
violating his probation without counsel present, any alleged error was corrected by the fact 
that defendant did have counsel at two other hearings prior to his being sentenced as a 
result of his probation violation (R. 88:1-14, 89:1-8). If defendant had any basis for 
objecting to his probation being revoked, defense counsel undoubtedly would have raised 
such an objection at the subsequent hearings. He did not. 
10 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURTS FAILURE TO SERVE AN 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE UPON DEFENDANT PRIOR 
TO HIS PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING DID 
NOT DEPRIVE THE COURT OF SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION. 
On appeal, defendant contends that the district court's failure to serve an order to 
show cause on him prior to his probation violation hearing deprived the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Aplt. Brief at 13-16. However, in support of the merits of this 
argument, defendant cites only one case, State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997), 
which is inapposite to the present case. Grate involved the question of whether the 
district court had jurisdiction to revoke Grate's probation where he was not charged with 
a probation violation until after his original probation term expired. IdL at 1163. Here, 
it is undisputed that all relevant events occurred within defendant's probationary period. 
In fact, defendant has not, and indeed cannot, argue that the district court acted after his 
probation expired because his probation does not expire until January 2000 (R. 1:52-53, 
11:46-47). Moreover, Grate concerned the district court's personal jurisdiction over Grate, 
not its subject matter jurisdiction. See id at 1166 ("our supreme court [has] identified the 
procedures a trial court must complete to retain jurisdiction over a probationer after the 
expiration of that probationer's initial term") (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Cook. 
803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990)). Thus, Grate is not relevant here. Nor does the statute at 
issue, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996), address subject matter jurisdiction under 
11 
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the circumstances of this case. In short, defendant has failed to cite, and the State has been 
unable to find, any authority for the proposition that failure to serve an order to show 
cause upon a defendant prior to his probation violation hearing deprives a district court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Because an appellant's failure to adequately brief an issue is 
fatal to consideration of that issue on appeal, see State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 
(Utah 1998), defendant's subject matter jurisdiction argument fails.3 
3
 Moreover, even if this Court recasts defendant's argument as a due process claim 
(lack of notice), which it more properly is, see State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 
(Utah App. 1995), it is still of no avail to defendant for several reasons. First, defendant 
did not preserve this argument below. It is well settled that "a contemporaneous objection 
or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal." State v. 
Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 
(Utah 1987)). The reason for this rule is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to 
address and, if appropriate, cure the claimed error. State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 
1161 (Utah 1991). Here, defendant did not object to the lack of an order to show cause 
at any of the three hearings regarding the revocation of his probation (R. 87:1-3, 88:1-14, 
89:1-8); thus, the district court was never given the opportunity to ensure that an order to 
show cause was made part of the record. Second, on appeal defendant does not rely on 
plain error or exceptional circumstances to circumvent the preservation requirement. See 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 09 (Utah 1993) (stating elements of plain error); 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (limiting "exceptional circumstances" 
to "rare procedural anomalies"), cert, denied. 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). This omission 
is fatal to defendant's claim. Merely briefing an unpreserved issue on appeal is insufficient 
to satisfy the preservation requirement. Where an appellant "does not argue that 
'exceptional circumstances1 or 'plain error* justifies a review of the issue, [this Court will] 
decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(citation omitted); accord State v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994) 
(declining to address issue where defendant briefed it on appeal, but did not assert either 
exceptional circumstances or plain error). Lastly, the district court's failure to serve an 
order to show cause on defendant prior to his probation revocation hearing did not violate 
his due process rights because defendant has not shown how receipt of an order to show 
cause would have "'substantially further[ed] the accuracy and reliability of the . . . fact 
finding process."' State v. Bvington. 936 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
Neel v. Holden. 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Utah 1994)). This is especially true here where 
defendant was informed of the time and place of the hearing and of his right to be 
represented by counsel and present evidence. Thus, the purposes of the order to show 
cause, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(c) (Supp. 1996), were met in this case. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. 
Moreover, because this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would 
add nothing to the body of Utah law. 
& 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2L day of March, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
NORMAN E. PLATE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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